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JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES: DOES "SHALL" MEAN
"MAY?"
The petitioners, Hand and Raulerson, were charged with and con-
victed of robbery. In the former case there was an oral request for a
jury instruction on the lesser included offense of larceny and in the latter
case there was a similar written request. The trial judges denied both
requests. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed both the Hand'
and Raulerson' convictions. The two cases were consolidated for purposes
of appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida which held, reversed: Upon
timely request a trial judge is duty bound to instruct the jury that should
they be unable to find from the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that
the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, they could consider the
evidence to determine whether the defendant is guilty of a lesser included
offense. Hand v. State, 199 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1967).
Florida statutory law reflects two legislative mandates which appear
to govern the instant case. Florida Statutes, section 919.16 (1965), now
known as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.510 declares:'
Upon an indictment or information, for any offense the jurors
may convict the defendant of an attempt to commit such offense,
if such an attempt is an offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. The court shall charge the jury in this
regard. (emphasis added).
Furthermore, in the determination of degrees of an offense, Florida Stat-
utes, section 919.14 (1965), now known as Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 1.490 directs that:4
If the indictment or information charges an offense which is
divided into degrees, without specifying the degree, the jurors
may find the defendant guilty of any degree of the offense
charged; if the indictment or information charges a particular
degree the jurors may find the defendant guilty of the degree
charged or any lesser degree. The court shall in all such cases
charge the jury as to the degrees of the offense. (emphasis
added).
The main conflict within the cases which have interpreted sections
919.14 and 919.16 centers around the word shall. Does shall reflect a
legislative mandate which prevents the trial judge from applying any
1. Hand v. State, 188 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
2. Raulerson v. State, 188 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
3. The new rule, effective midnight December 31, 1967, is the same as the statute ex-
cept for the inclusion of the use of affidavits in the rule. The former statute is now super-
seded by the rule. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1967).
4. See note 3 supra.
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evidential tests before instructing the jury on lesser included offenses,'
or does shall mean the trial judge may apply such evidential tests? The
problem reduced to its simplest form is whether the giving of jury in-
structions on lesser included offenses is discretionary with the trial judge,
or whether it is a mandatory requirement.
One line of case authority in Florida sanctions the trial judge's
power to first evaluate the evidence to see if a reasonable jury could
convict the defendant of a necessarily included lesser offense and not the
offense charged. If the trial judge determines that a reasonable jury
could not find that the defendant committed the lesser included offense,
then the judge is under no duty to instruct on the lesser included offense.
It is only when the evidence is reasonably susceptible of an inference
by the jury, as determined by the judge, that the defendant could not
have committed the offense charged, but that he could have committed
a lesser included offense, that the judge must instruct on the lesser in-
cluded offense.
The First District Court of Appeal in reviewing the Hand6 case fol-
lowed this line of authority. The court stated that the evidence was not
reasonably susceptible of an inference by the jury that the articles were
taken without force, violence, assault or putting in fear. 7 Therefore, an
instruction on the lesser included offense of larceny was not warranted.
In effect, the jury being unaware of its power to convict the defendant
of larceny could either convict him of robbery or free him.
The foundation of this line of reasoning is embedded in decisions
made prior to 1939,8 the year in which sections 919.14 and 919.16 were
enacted. It is interesting to note that some courts would choose to revert
to the pre-1939 era.9 Basically, Florida courts which have construed these
statutes to confer a limited power on the trial judge to charge on lesser
included offenses, have given jury instructions pertaining to lesser in-
cluded offenses only when the record,' ° a reasonable view of the evi-
5. The threshold question in the instant case is whether or not the instruction asked
for is one in regard to a necessarily lesser included offense. In regard to larceny, the Supreme
Court in Arnold v. State, 83 So.2d 105, 108 (Fla. 1955) said: "There can be no doubt that
the crime of robbery necessarily includes the crime of larceny, the difference primarily being
that robbery is an aggravated form of larceny involving force and violence."
6. Supra note 1.
7. Supra note 1, at 365-366.
8. The Supreme Court recognized this line of reasoning in Southworth v. State, 98 Fla.
1184, 125 So. 345, 348 (1929) when it stated: "It is not the duty of the court to charge the
jury upon a degree of homicide to which the evidence could not apply."
9. The Second District Court of Appeal in State v. Brown, 118 So.2d 574, 580 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1960) declared: "Were this court to have this question before us as one of first im-
pression, we would follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida which were ren-
dered prior to 1939."
10. McClendon v. State, 196 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1967); Goswick v. State, 143 So.2d 817
(Fla. 1962).
1967]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
dence," or the information or indictment 2 will support the lesser
included offense.
The chief protagonist of this interpretation is the First District Court
of Appeal. The majority" of cases decided by that court, have sustained
the view that the evidence must be susceptible of an inference by the jury
that the accused committed the lesser included offense and not the offense
charged.' 4 Possibly it is the court's strong conviction to limit the power of
the jury which has prompted it to expose this position. As the court ex-
plained in Silver v. State6 (where the evidence did not point to the lesser
included offense):
[1]t is apparent that the jury could not with propriety have
found the appellant guilty of petit larceny. To hold otherwise
would permit the jury to usurp the legislative function by using
its verdict as a vehicle by which to reduce the sentence to less
than the minimum prescribed by the legislature for the crime
committed, and also to usurp the judicial function by depriving
the court of the power to impose a sentence within the limits
prescribed by the statute for such crime.
This position would prevent the jury from mitigating the defendant's guilt
by finding a verdict for a lesser included offense, thereby reducing the
defendant's debt to society. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court implied
in the Hand case, if the defendant is acquitted of the crime charged the
state could institute another action bringing the defendant back into court
on a necessarily included lesser offense which stemmed solely from the
commission of the crime for which the defendant was acquitted. 7
11. Sandine v. State, 172 So.2d 634 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). For decisions rendered by the
First District Court of Appeal, see note 14 infra.
12. Lindsay v. State, 53 Fla. 56, 43 So. 87 (1907); Stewart v. State, 187 So.2d 358
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Bradney v. State, 185 So.2d 726 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
13. The striking exception to the First District's trend of decisions is Allison v. State,
162 So.2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). The Court stated in reference to instructions on
lesser included offenses that: "[T]he court had the duty to so charge the jury even if the
defendant had not requested such a charge."
14. Sprinkle v. State, 203 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) ; Adams v. State, 201 So.2d
494 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) ; Tanner v. State, 197 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) ; Toler v.
State, 193 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) ; Little v. State, 192 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1966) rev'd, 206 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1968) ; Brown v. State, 191 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966);
Raulerson v. State, 188 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966), rev'd, 199 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1967);
Hand v. State, 188 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966), rev'd, 199 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1967) ; Stewart
v. State, 187 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) ; Silver v. State, 174 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1965).
15. See Silver v. State, 174 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
16. Id. at 95.
17. This justification for the Supreme Court's decision in Hand, that instructing on lesser
included offenses would eliminate this problem is difficult to accept. As early as 1884, in
Boswell v. State, 20 Fla. 869 (1884) the Supreme Court recognized the principle that an
acquittal or conviction of the offense charged would bar a subsequent prosecution for a
lesser included offense. Furthermore, in Wilcox v. State, 183 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1966) the court said: "A prior conviction or acquittal will bar a subsequent trial for the same
offense or for a lesser offense necessarily included in the first offense."
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The second line of case authority in Florida is that the trial judge
shall instruct the jury on necessarily included offenses.' 8 This interpreta-
tion of sections 919.14 and 919.16 removes the trial judge's limited power
to evaluate the evidence before he decides whether or not to charge the
jury on lesser included offenses. An instruction to the jury on necessarily
included lesser offenses shall be given, irrespective of whether or not the
trial judge considers the lesser offense supported by reasonable inferences
from the evidence. This was the position adopted by the Supreme Court
of Florida in Hand.
The only conditions precedent to the trial judge's duty to so instruct
are that the charge asked for is a necessarily included offense' 9 and that
the defendant in fact requested such a charge.2 0 As in the present con-
solidated cases, either an oral request or a written request made to the
trial judge will suffice.
There are two factors which must be explored before this issue can
be considered settled in Florida. These factors appear on the legal hori-
zon as clouds to the certainty of the Supreme Court's decision in Hand.
The first cloud springs from the Supreme Court itself. In the case of
Flagler v. State,2' decided two months prior to the Hand case, dealing
with the necessity to request instructions on lesser included offenses, the
court tended to support the view that the judge could evaluate the evi-
dence. The opinion praises the view taken by the First District Court of
Appeal, the very same view which the court reversed shortly thereafter in
Hand. The court stated:
To begin, it seems to this court that the contention of the
petitioner may well be concluded on authority of an excellent
opinion by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in the
case of Brown v. State, 191 So.2d 296. According to the opinion
in that case, the sole question presented on appeal was whether
or not error was committed when the trial judge declined to
charge the jury on the lesser included offense of petit larceny.
The court held that the giving of such a charge would have been
error even if it had been requested in writing. 2 (emphasis
added).
It is difficult to reconcile the fact that the court praises the line of reason-
ing which it is soon to reverse. The doctrine in Brown2 would give the
18. Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1959) ; Killen v. State, 92 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1957);
jimenez v. State, 158 Fla. 719, 30. So.2d 292 (1947); State v. Barnes, 182 So.2d 260 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1966); Wilson v. State, 171 So.2d 903 (Fla: 2d Dist. 1965); Miller v. State, 170
So.2d 319 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
19. See note 5 supra.
20. Flagler v. State, 198 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1967).
21. 198 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1967).
22. Id. at 314.
23. Brown v. State, 191 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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trial judge the power to test the evidence. Whereas the doctrine in Hand
dictates that no evidential tests shall be applicable.
The second cloud springs from that noted area of turbulence on this
issue, the First District Court of Appeal. In two cases subsequent to the
Hand case the First District bitterly attacks the Hand position. In Adams
v. State,24 Chief Judge Wigginton, concurring specially, announced:
[T] he principle of law pronounced by the Supreme Court in the
Hand and Raulerson cases, cited in the majority opinion, is bad
law, unsupportable by logic or reason, and requires the giving of
instructions in the trial of criminal cases which have no founda-
tion in or relationship to the evidence adduced at the trial.25
(emphasis added).
In the subsequent case of Griffin v. State,2" the court in commenting upon
the logic deduced from the Hand case stated:
Under this reasoning a trial court should never be allowed to
direct a verdict or render a summary judgment in favor of either
party to any judicial proceeding on the ground there is no evi-
dence to support a verdict for the nonmoving party because in
doing so the trial judge would thereby be invading the province
of the jury.27
The First District, although following the Hand decision, has openly chal-
lenged the validity of the Supreme Court's decision possibly in an attempt
to convince the Supreme Court to retreat to the First District's view.
It is the writer's opinion that Florida has adopted a realistic under-
standing of the purpose of the jury in criminal cases with the Hand deci-
sion. Sections 919.14 and 919.16 allow the jury to return a verdict con-
victing the defendant of a lesser degree, or a necessarily lesser included
offense of the crime charged. Therefore, why should the judge be a mid-
dleman to decide what a reasonable jury could infer from the evidence
pertaining to the lesser included offense? The Supreme Court has stated:
"[T]he responsibility of determining the degree of guilt in such cases
rests peculiarly within the bosom of the trial jury."2 If the jury is charged
with determining the guilt of the defendant then it should be given as
many instructions as are proper to aid them in determining the defen-
dant's debt to society. The jury which does not know that it has the alter-
natives of freeing the defendant, convicting him of the offense charged or
24. Adams v. State, 201 So.2d 494 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967). The court did apply the Hand
decision, although criticizing its merit.
25. Id. at 495.
26. Griffin v. State, 202 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967). The court did apply the Hand
decision, although criticizing its merit.
27. Id. at 603.
28. Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1960).
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convicting him of a lesser included offense, cannot render an acceptable
verdict in line with the laws of Florida.29
CHARLEs KANTOR
IMPLIED WARRANTY: DISCLAIMER INEFFECTIVE
Plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer and retail dealer
alleging breach of express and implied warranties and demanding return
of the purchase price of a "lemon" automobile. The trial court granted
final summary judgment for the manufacturer based upon a lack of priv-
ity and the disclaimer of warranties contained in the contract of sale.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed, per curiam. On
certification to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, reversed and re-
manded: An action may be maintained against a manufacturer notwith-
standing a lack of privity.' Furthermore, the terms of the contract of sale
do not operate to disclaim implied warranties. There is no sound reason
for distinguishing between liability for personal injury and economic
loss on these issues,2 and liability is particularly warranted where the
manufacturer uses mass advertising to market his product.3 Manheim v.
Ford Motor Co., 201 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967).
29. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in the recent case of Little v. State, 206
So.2d 9 (Fla. 1968). The Court held that where the lower court in a robbery prosecution
found that the crime of robbery had been proved, the defendant was entitled to an instruction
on the lesser included offense of larceny.
1. Except for the advertising rationale, this issue will not be noted because it was al-
ready well established in Florida that lack of privity did not bar an implied warranty action
against a manufacturer. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp. v. Bernstein, 181 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1966);
Power Ski, Inc. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 188 So.2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). See also Engel v.
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 198 So.2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (warranty coverage
still limited to users of the product).
2. A well-developed discussion of this point may be found in Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), reversing 82 N.J. Super. 319, 197 A.2d
589 (App. Div. 1964).
3. It should be emphasized that the decision went on to only discuss the manufacturer's
liability under implied warranties. The court did not hold that the mass advertising created
either an express or implied warranty. The failure to clearly state what express warranty
liability existed or to distinguish between express and implied warranty liability considerably
clouded the opinion.
Some jurisdictions have used mass advertising by the manufacturer as a rationale for
eliminating the privity requirement in implied warranty actions. Hamon v. Digliani, 148
Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1964) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d
399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) ; Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d
337 (1967); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); Markovich v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958); Jacob E. Decker &
Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
Other jurisdictions have held that mass advertising creates an express warranty upon
which the ultimate buyer may bring an action. Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96,
36 S.W.2d 859 (1931) ; Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253
